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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
the principal case contended that the granting of a pretrial exam-
ination would, in effect, be a futile procedure.123  The court,
however, did not wish to be so restrictive and held that, hereafter,
pretrial examinations will be granted in defamation actions despite
the possibility that the defendant might claim his privilege. It was
felt that the existence of such a possibility should not preclude
any examination at all; the defendant may take advantage of his
privilege when the privileged matter itself is sought.
Scope of Disclosure in Matrimonial Actions
In O'Donovan v. O'Donovan,'24 the complaint contained four
causes of action. The plaintiff sought a judgment declaring the
defendant's Mexican divorce invalid, a separation on the grounds
of abandonment and adultery and a divorce. The defendant moved
to vacate or modify the plaintiff's notice, which sought to examine
him before trial upon all the relevant and material facts put in
issue by the pleadings. The court granted the defendant's motion,
limiting the plaintiff to an examination of the defendant upon
factual issues material and necessary to plaintiff's cause of action to
establish the invalidity of the Mexican decree, which matters do
not strictly relate to the relations between the parties during their
marriage.
Under the CPA, there were general limitations on disclosure
based upon distinctions: (1) between witnesses and parties; (2)
between admissible evidence and information leading to admissible
evidence on the one hand, and necessary and material evidence
on the other; and (3) between categories of actions.125 In matri-
monial actions, pretrial examinations were generally denied on the
ground that such an examination might prevent a reconciliation of
the parties. 126 Pretrial examinations were not permitted in divorce
actions, 127 or in separation actions, unless special circumstances were
shown.128  However, examinations were allowed in annulment
123 See Corbett v. De Comeau, 44 Super. Ct. 306 (N. Y. 1878), wherein
it was held that a pretrial examination would not be granted in a libel
action because it would be a waste of time.
12441 Misc. 2d 82, 244 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct 1963).
125 FIRST REP. 118.
126 Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 294, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012
(1st Dep't 1960).
127E.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 182 Misc. 860, 49 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
128E.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 7 App. Div. 2d 859, 182 N.Y.S.2d
31 (2d Dep't 1959); Augustin v. Augustin, 277 App. Div. 777, 97 N.Y.S.2d
430 (2d Dep't 1950); Tavalin v. Tavalin, 13 Misc. 2d 909, 179 N.Y.S.2d
137 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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actions,1 20 actions for separate maintenance'3 ° and actions to set
aside separation agreements. 131
In the instant case the court states that no change in the
former procedure regarding examinations before trial in matrimon-
ial actions has been effected by the CPLR. Although the court
concedes that the Revisers originally intended to abolish the limita-
tions on disclosure,1 32 the opinion points out that substantial
changes were later (and prior to enactment of) made in section
3101(a) and that, as finally enacted, that section was intended
to continue the scope of disclosure that existed under prior
practice.' 33
Disclosure With Respect to Third-Party Actions
In Ciaffone v. Manhattantown, Inc., 3 4 the third-party defend-
ant moved for a pretrial examination of a defendant other than
the third-party plaintiff. The requested pretrial examination sought
to encompass all the issues of the main action. The court denied
the motion but held that the third-party defendant may examine the
codefendant in the main action only as to those matters which
were material and necessary to the third-party action.
In most of the instances involving pretrial examinations in
third-party actions, it is the original plaintiff who seeks to conduct
an examination of the third-party defendant and vice versa. Early
CPA cases held that unless the original plaintiff amended his
claim so as to assert a claim against the third-party defendant or
the third-party defendant denied the allegations of the main com-
plaint so as to become an adverse party as to the plaintiff, the
demand by either the original plaintiff or the third-party defendant
129 E.g., Grinnell v. Grinnell, 15 App. Div. 2d 468, 222 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st
Dep't 1961); Mook v. Mook, 13 App. Div. 2d 465, 212 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st
Dep't 1961); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 12 App. Div. 2d 627, 208 N.Y.S.2d 343
(2d Dep't 1960); Sefranka v. Sefranka, 190 Misc. 541, 74 N.Y.S.2d 519
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
130E.g., Berlin.v. Berlin, 17 Misc. 2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
131 E.g., Vose v. Vose, 250 App. Div. 883, 295 N.Y. Supp. 244 (2d Dep't
1937): Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 230 App. Div. 483, 245 N.Y. Supp. 253
(1st Dep't 1930); Cavallo v. Cavallo, 33 Misc. 2d 245, 224 N.Y.S.2d 937
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Sallah v. Sallah, 28 Misc. 2d 130, 219 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
132 FIRST REP. 117.
133 1962 N.Y. Lim. Doc. No. 8, SIXTH REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY THE
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE CIVIL PRAcICE AcT
30, 43 [hereinafter cited as SIXTH REP.].
34 20 App. Div. 2d 641, 246 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum
decision).
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